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Abstract. In this paper, the details of critical infrastructure protection program of
United States of America are shared by taking the cyber resilience into account.
The academic and institutional studies on the concepts of cyber maturity, critical
infrastructure protection program and cyber resilience are explained in detail. By
the help of these studies and national efforts, the relations among these concepts
are proposed. The key components of a cyber security strategy and action plan for
a cyber resilient society is proposed by taking these three concepts into account.
As the final step, the recent cyber security efforts of Turkey is shared with the
reader and assesses according to the determined key components.
Keywords. Critical Infrastructures, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Cyber
Resilience, Cyber Maturity, Cybersecurity Strategy

1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare and/or
national security of countries. In recent years, both government officials and academia
work through the damage potential of cyber war to critical infrastructures. Most of the
developed countries have governmental/national critical infrastructure protection
programs. All of the critical infrastructure protection programs take the consequences
of cyber threats and/or a possible cyber war into consideration. Turkey has such a
critical infrastructure protection program as well. By looking at the results of the twoyear cyber efforts in Turkey, it can be seen that the success of critical infrastructure
protection program is directly related to the level of the national cyber maturity. The
second finding is the relation between critical infrastructure protection program and
cyber resilience. A successful critical infrastructure protection program will result in a
resilient society against cyber threats and cyber war. In this regard, critical
infrastructure protection program stands between national cyber security and cyber
resilience in the context of cyber war.
Firstly, national cyber maturity is a must-have baseline for the success of critical cyber
efforts of Turkey; especially the ones that require the cooperation between different
types of organizations. The critical infrastructure protection program will be left
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unfinished and be condemned to fail without sufficient level of the national cyber
maturity. The most important subjects of national cyber maturity are individuals and
organizations. There are vital technical and organizational efforts that will create or
increase the cyber maturity of individuals and organizations within a country and will
result in cyber maturity of a country. There are good practices in Turkey for this goal.
These efforts will definitely take some time in order to be internalized by individuals
and organizations, also these efforts need to be measured and assessed in order to take
consecutive actions.
Secondly, cyber resilient society is a result of a successful critical infrastructure
protection program. Once a countrywide and strategically embraced critical
infrastructure protection program is succeeded, the effects of this program will
penetrate into the organizations, individuals and society by taking some technical or
organizational actions like awareness activities, exercises and new coordinator bodies.
So that cyber resilient society will emerge. Therefore, national cyber maturity is a
prerequisite to a successful critical infrastructure protection program. In the same way;
critical infrastructure protection program is a prerequisite to cyber resilient society.
Although it seems like the efforts pertaining to these three concepts are sequential, they
should be iteratively completed. As an example, the output of critical infrastructure
protection program may provide useful inputs to national cyber security efforts.
This article will focus on both technical (IT) and organizational/policy (public and
private sector) aspects of cyber security. In order to build a cyber-resilient society to
cyber warfare, best practices will be shared with the government officials and
researchers.
2. Background
At this section, firstly, the term critical infrastructure is defined and the brief history of
the term is shared. Secondly, the use of cyber systems in critical infrastructures and the
rise of cyber threats are depicted with examples. Thirdly, the terms critical
infrastructure protection and cyber resilience are explained by giving example from
United States of America. Fourthly, the studies that explore the cyber maturity and
cyber readiness are summarized.
2.1. Cyber Systems and Cyber Threats as Enablers
Any physical or cyber infrastructure is called critical infrastructure, if damage to that
infrastructure will have a harmful effect on economy of the country, social order and/or
national security [1]. The term critical Infrastructure is first used within the Executive
Order of President of United States in 1996 [2]. The purpose of the order was to
introduce the term “Critical Infrastructure Protection”, to define the problem and to
establish interim commissions in order to recommend comprehensive strategies and
amendments to the existing laws in order to protect critical infrastructures. Executive
order mentioned two types of threats against critical infrastructures; physical threats
and cyber threats. Although, critical infrastructures exist long before the widespread
use of cyber technologies and Internet prevalence; the Critical Infrastructure Protection
is defined as an important governmental term because of dominant use of cyber
systems in infrastructures that serve society. There are two reasons for this. Firstly,
cyber systems welcomes a novel type of threats; called cyber threats. Cyber threats are

asymmetric in nature; an attacker can hide himself easily, the cyber weapons are
extremely cheap and prevalent compared to the conventional weapons. Therefore,
cyber threats pay the way for harmful attacks against critical infrastructures easily and
effortlessly. Secondly, cyber systems caused or increased interdependencies among
critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are considered the main cause of
cascading failures [3], [4]. Meaning that, a problem in one infrastructure may result in a
subsequent failure in another. As an example, a problem in telecommunication
infrastructure may have weakening effect on finance infrastructure, as witnessed in
Russian hackers’ attacks to Estonian networks in 2007 [5]. Therefore, countries started
to think about critical infrastructure protection more seriously.
2.2. Cyber Threat Landscape
Today, cyber systems are used vastly in monitoring and controlling of critical
infrastructures. SCADA systems that are used in controlling energy, water management
systems are example of such cyber systems. Smart grids, smart transportation systems,
remotely controllable local gas distribution systems have been emerging as vital parts
of modern society. Apart from SCADA systems, some critical infrastructures are
completely dependent on conventional cyber systems. For instance, the banking and
finance infrastructure depends on conventional information technologies to a great
extent. The daily operations of banking and finance companies are totally depended on
their huge server parks and network infrastructures. Telecommunication infrastructure
is completely composed of cyber systems. In other words, cyber systems created a new
critical infrastructure called telecommunication. Without telecommunication
infrastructures, modern society cannot be maintained. Because of new service models
like cloud computing, Internet can be regarded as critical infrastructure. The attacks to
the Estonia networks in 2007 showed how a well-being of a country is depended on
Internet infrastructure.
Although Internet is physically distributed, it is logically single. Therefore, Internet
connects physically detached things (people, organizations and states) in the same
medium. This means that, we share the same medium with cyber attackers having
different motivations; from cyber criminals to state sponsored hackers. Today, some of
the critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet [6]. The infrastructures that do
not have direct connection to Internet are usually connected to internal production
networks of organizations. Hence, critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet
after passing one hop [7].
Once a simple search is performed by using popular search engines, one can come
across with a number of news speaking of cyber attacks against critical infrastructures
like nuclear plant, electrical grid, sewing infrastructure, flight control systems and
harbor [8], [9].
2.3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Program and Cyber Resilience
The use of cyber systems at critical infrastructures is a necessity without doubt. For
some infrastructures, Internet connection is a rigid requirement to serve citizens and/or
customers suitably. The focus for critical infrastructure operators is the contribution of
cyber systems to efficient and cost effective management of critical infrastructures.
However for states, cyber systems must be used according to some specific policies
because of attack potential of cyber threats. At this point, critical infrastructure

protection program comes to scene. The importance of critical infrastructures
necessitates the state level coordination of security efforts according to the some rigid
policies, strategies and procedures. These hierarchical set of rules are called critical
infrastructure protection program. Critical infrastructure protection program is the
national and coordinated efforts in order to keep the critical infrastructures protected
from both cyber and physical threats. A number of countries, including developing
ones, have critical infrastructure protection programs. Some developed countries, like
Unites States of America, have been working on this subject for decades. Most of the
developed countries started to prepare programs within last five to ten years. Today,
critical infrastructure protection programs of all countries give an important place to
cyber threats.
In developed countries, critical infrastructure protection program is an important part of
the national security efforts. In other words, national security officials take cyber
security into account because of widespread use of cyber systems and their vulnerable
nature. This consideration is materialized with the critical infrastructure protection
programs. Because critical infrastructure protection programs fall under national
security programs of developed countries, critical infrastructure protection programs
not only deal with cyber threats but also with physical threats.
Critical infrastructure protection program is not a single strategy document or it is not
associated with a single governmental effort. It does not have to be a unified effort or
document with predefined start and due dates so that after some sufficient time period
critical infrastructures will be protected. Rather, it is an ongoing and always evolving
set of activities, which can be revised according to the new type of threats or recently
added national critical infrastructures. That is, critical infrastructure protection is an
everlasting process. It is the total effort of a country in order to protect critical
infrastructures from cyber and physical threats. A critical infrastructure program is
composed of policies, strategies, standards, legislations. As environment and
requirements change, new policies and strategies may be released, new responsibilities
may be emerged. Since an effective critical infrastructure protection program requires
the participation of a number of public and private entities, the coordinator body should
be at the highest possible government level.
2.3.1. Cyber Resilience Efforts of Unites States of America
National Infrastructure Protection Plan is the central document of the current critical
infrastructure protection program of United States of America [10]. The subtitle of the
plan is “Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”. As this subtitle
implies, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan emphasizes the partnership of
public and private entities. The aim of the plan is to establish the collaboration and
cooperation routines in order to achieve secure and resilient infrastructures. National
Infrastructure Protection Plan is released pursuant to the Presidential Policy Directive21 [11]. The name of Presidential Policy Directive -21 is Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience. This directive can be regarded as the initiator of the critical
infrastructure protection efforts of United States in recent years. Presidential Policy
Directive -21 equally emphasize the physical and cyber threats. Directive says that “It
is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of its critical
infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.”
The term “resilience” is used both in National Infrastructure Protection Plan and
Presidential Policy Directive – 21. It implies that the protection of critical

infrastructures is an exhaustive process; it should be considered as not a simple result.
Presidential Policy Directive – 21 defines resilience as “the ability to prepare for and
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.
Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks,
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents”.
Cyber resilience can be defined as the robustness of a country against cyber attacks. It
is the preparedness efforts of a country for a cyber war. Therefore, cyber resilience is
something parallel with defensive actions of a state [12]. The offensive strategies and
efforts cannot be regarded within the cyber resilience effort of a state. Hence, there is
strong relationship between critical infrastructure protection programs and cyber
resilience. Critical infrastructure protection program is the prominent effort in order to
have a cyber resilient country and society.
2.3.2. National Infrastructure Protection Plan
Some introductory information about National Infrastructure Protection Plan is given in
the previous section. The national plan is a document that sets forth the details of a risk
management framework and a detailed call to action. Risk management is the core
process for critical infrastructure security and resilience; and it is fully integrated with
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Because achieving resilience is directly
related with the successful risk management process [10]. The proposed risk
management framework has five steps. These steps are:
1) Set goals and objectives
2) Identify infrastructures
3) Assess and analyze risks
4) Implement risk management activities
5) Measure effectiveness
According to the framework, physical, cyber, and human elements of critical
infrastructures should be considered through all steps of the framework. Entire risk
management framework is accompanied by information sharing mechanisms.
Information sharing is used as feedback mechanism to convey the results of
measurement of effectiveness. All of the steps of risk management framework is set
forth in this section. The linkage between these steps and call to action items are shown
with call-out boxes. National Infrastructure Protection Plan does not urge critical
infrastructure operators to use this framework. Rather, risk management framework is
an “organizing construct” for different type of infrastructures.
The call to action section of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan is a detailed
action plan in order to enhance national critical infrastructure security and resilience.
This section refer to all of the critical infrastructure partners and stakeholders, whether
public and private entity. The basic themes of the call to action section are sector or
cross-sector collaboration, cooperation, partnership and information sharing among
different types of partners and stakeholders. The details of collaboration, cooperation,
partnership and information sharing activities and routines are given under this section.
Call to action has twelve actions to advance national efforts. All of these actions are
linked to national goals by using call-out boxes which were given in second section of
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
National Infrastructure Protection Plan contain the list of the partners and stakeholders
of the critical infrastructure protection community, form federal government agencies
to private sector entities. The document also list the roles, responsibilities and

capabilities of these stakeholder. These appendices are extremely useful for the experts
who try to understand the organizational structure of United States.
2.3.3. Presidential Policy Directive – 21
Presidential Policy Directive -21 is the stimulus of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan. It determined the organizational structure, roles and responsibilities for
critical infrastructure protection. Presidential Policy Directive -21 organized critical
infrastructure into 16 sectors and identified Sector-Specific Agencies for these sectors.
It is important to share some remarkable points of the Presidential Policy Directive - 21.
The “interconnectedness and interdependency” of critical infrastructures are
emphasized in the directive. Directive draws attention to interconnectedness and
interdependency in order to emphasize the importance of coordination, collaboration
and partnership. Directive mentions the “effective partnerships with critical
infrastructure owners and operators”. It is said that “this partnership is imperative to
strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure”. Three
strategic imperatives for critical infrastructure security and resilience are:
1) “Refining and clarifying functional relationships across the Federal
Government”
2) “Enable effective information exchange”
3) “Implement an integration and analysis function” [11].
From these excerpts, it can be easily seen that, isolated, infrastructure-specific efforts
do not performed. Because of connected nature of cyber space, the national efforts have
to be unified, collaborative. These efforts have to take interdependencies, relationships
and partnership into account. These are prerequisites of a successful Critical
Infrastructure Protection Plan. These prerequisites are not technical countermeasures.
These can be thought as soft skills of a state. Soft skills means they are related with
security culture and years and even decades can be required in order to be internalized.
Once internalized, cyber maturity is succeeded.
Finally, Presidential Policy Directive – 21 emphasize the importance of international
cooperation and promoting research and development activities.
2.3.4. Executive Order - 13636
Executive Order – 13636 is released at the same time with Presidential Policy Directive
– 21 [13]. The title of the Executive Order 13636 is Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity. As the name implies, it is dedicated to cyber security Executive Order –
13636 is released after the delay of US Cybersecurity Act in Senate in summer of 2012.
Executive Order – 13636 assigns duty to Federal Government to coordinate with
critical infrastructure owners and operators to improve information sharing and
collaboratively develop and implement risk-based approaches to cybersecurity [10].
Some of tasks that are assigned by Executive Order to Federal Agencies are as follows:
1) Increasing the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information
shared with U.S. private sector entities (Responsible bodies: Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence)
2) Expanding the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program (voluntary
information sharing program) to all critical infrastructure sectors in order to
assist the owners and operators of critical infrastructure in protecting their
systems (Responsible bodies: the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Defense)

3) Developing a Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible body: National Institute
of Standards and Technology Director) This framework is prepared by the
participation of representative of public and private organizations and released
[14].
4) Reviewing the preliminary release of Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible
bodies: Sector-Specific Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Office
of Management and Budget)
5) Preparing a report for the President, on the feasibility, security benefits, and
relative merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning
and contract administration. (Responsible body: Secretary of Defense)
6) Using a risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure, reviewing and
updating the list of identified critical infrastructure on an annual basis
(Responsible bodies: the Secretary of Homeland Security)
2.4. Cyber Maturity and Cyber Readiness: The Definitions
There is limited number of academic studies that try to define the term cyber maturity
on its own. However they express slight difference between these terms. Most of the
studies use cyber maturity instead of cyber readiness. The term cyber maturity and
readiness is used in order to represent the preparedness level of the states against cyber
threats.
Cyber maturity is a set of underlying soft skills of a country in order to increase its
cyber resilience persistently and continuously. These skills help a country in
succeeding its cyber security efforts like critical infrastructure protection program. The
critical infrastructure protection programs of cyber mature countries always evolves
and improves. Cyber maturity is not a technical notion. It is the set of capabilities that
are created and internalized in a long time. It is closely related with the security culture
and awareness level of society. The countries that are mature in terms of cyber security,
will probably have long lasting and ever evolving critical infrastructure protection
programs. This kind of countries increase their cyber resilience constantly over years.
These good practices are underlying success factors for countries dealing with cyber
threats and will definitely affect the quality of critical infrastructure protection
programs. If a country implements these good practices, critical infrastructure
protection program will be successful. If a country is not mature, its cyber security
efforts will not be vigorous. Although the country may take successful steps for the
cyber security of critical infrastructures occasionally, the efforts will not be long lasting,
they will probably depend on some enthusiastic people or organizations. In other words,
the efforts will not be the result of the real state policy.
In this section of paper, the parameters and metrics that constitutes the cyber maturity
are extracted from the efforts of United States, OECD (Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development), ITU (International Telecommunication Union) and
related academic studies. While examining these studies, the technical countermeasures
and policy items are not on focus, but the underlying long-term countermeasure, which
are mostly related with the security culture.
2.4.1. The Paper of Hurley, Kern, & Everetts
This academic work draws a difference between cyber maturity and cyber readiness.
Cyber readiness implies completeness; however this is not possible [15]. Because

100% security is impossible. Therefore, authors propose the term cyber maturity
instead of cyber readiness in order to have more practical outcomes. According to the
paper, the concept of cyber readiness is usually used with the terms situational
awareness and resilience. Some crucial components that imply a cyber-mature state are
extracted from the paper. These components are:
1) Information sharing
2) Education and awareness activities
3) Support for cyber research and development
4) Risk assessment and management
5) Performance measurement
6) Executive support
7) Addressing international challenges
8) Determining detailed roles and responsibilities
9) Overarching cybersecurity strategy
10) Justification the need for investments by measuring costs.
2.4.2. The Paper of White
According to the White, a certain level cyber security maturity has to be accomplished
in order to prevent and detect cyber events [16]. At this paper, cyber security maturity
is stated along with the current cyber security posture. The paper devises the model
called Community Cyber Security Maturity Model, having five levels form initial to
vanguard level. According to the White, there are four key areas for cyber security
maturity. These are awareness, information sharing, processes and procedures to handle
cyber events and test and evaluation of the cyber security countermeasures. The author
emphasis the importance of training in order to transition from one level to upper level.
2.4.3. Development of Policies for Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures
The OECD publication named Development of Policies for Protection of Critical
Information Infrastructures compares the development of policies for the protection of
critical infrastructures in seven developed countries [17].
The comparative study of OECD shares some of the good practices of cyber security. It
is said that these good practices are critical for successful implementation of
information security in public and private organizations. Some of these good practices
are listed as follows:
1) Clear policy and objectives for cyber security have to be set at state level.
2) The adopted approach for cyber security have to be consistent with the culture
of all the participants, whether public or private.
3) The state administration have to support and commit to the cyber security
studies.
4) Risk assessment and management processes have to be internalized in order to
identify the requirements of cyber security.
5) Information sharing has to be substantiated effectively among all of the
participants.
6) All relevant policy and standards have to be distributed to all of the
participants.
7) Required training and education facilities have to be performed.
8) In order to improve persistently and continually, measurements have to be
conducted in order to review the studies and countermeasures and give

necessary feedbacks.
Based on the good practices, some components are examined by OECD in order to
compare the critical infrastructure protection studies of seven developed countries. It is
claimed that these components are taken by governments into account when
implementing critical infrastructure programs. These components are:
1) A national strategy
2) Legal foundations
3) Incident response capability
4) Industry-government partnerships
5) A culture of security
6) Information sharing mechanisms
7) Risk management approach
Some of the good practices and components that are listed in OECD report can be
regarded as the parameters of cyber maturity.
2.4.4. Global Cybersecurity Index
Another comparative study is performed by ITU, which is called Global Cybersecurity
Index [18]. It is an ITU and ABI Research joint project in order to rank the
cybersecurity capabilities of countries. Four goals of this study are listed in the
webpage. These goals are as follows:
1) Promote government strategies at a national level
2) Drive implementation efforts across industries and sectors
3) Integrate security into the core of technological progress
4) Foster a global culture of cybersecurity
In order to reach these goals, ITU and ABI Research intent to identify the metrics of
cyber security performances of the nation states. A global ranking mechanism is aimed
based on these metrics. One of the important part of the project is its mechanism to
collect data. There are primary and secondary data sources. Primary data source is the
relevant national stakeholders. The secondary data source is publicly available sources.
There is an online questionnaire in project webpage as well. Anybody can participate in
this questionnaire. Another important part of the project is contact with relevant
organizations of nations’ in order to acquire data from primary sources. The final goal
of the project is to publish a global cybersecurity index of nation states.
The study of Global Cybersecurity Index evaluates the cyber security developments of
the states according to the five different areas. These areas are:
1) Legal Measures
2) Technical Measures
3) Organizational Measures
4) Capacity Building
5) Cooperation
Under legal measures area, both criminal legislation and general cyber security
regulation / compliance are assessed. Technical measures look at the existence of
national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), the governmentapproved standardization and personal certification studies. In organizational measures
area, the existence of a policy, which is expected to cover the following areas, are
examined:
1) Clear responsibility of cyber security at all levels of the government
2) Clearly defined, public and transparent roles and responsibilities;

3) Promotion of private sector involvement and public-private partnership
In this section, the existence of cyber security governance, responsible agency for
implementation of cyber security policies and the national benchmarking in the light of
nationally adopted standards are examined as well. Under the capacity building section,
the studies of the standardization development, the professional manpower
development, individual certification and agency certification are examined. Under the
cooperation section, intra-state, intra-agency and international cooperation activities are
examined. Apart from these activities, public-private partnership practices are
examined as well.
ITU published the parameters of ranking at project’s webpage in Global Cybersecurity
Index Conceptual Framework document which can be downloaded from project’s
website.
2.4.5. Cyber Readiness Index
A similar study was performed by cyber security expert Melissa Hathaway in 2013 [19].
The name of this study was Cyber Readiness Index. Hathaway published five
evaluation criteria in order to determine whether a country is cyber ready or not. These
criteria are as follows:
1) The existence of national cyber security strategy
2) The existence of operational Computer Security Incident Response Team
3) The commitment (by country) to protect against cyber crime
4) The existence of information sharing mechanisms
5) The existence of investments and funding (by country) of research activities
Under the first criterion, not only the existence of national cyber security strategy is
examined; but also the existence of budged that is assigned to strategy is examined.
This criterion also considers the participation and engagement of private sector to
national cyber security strategy.
Under the second criterion, the existence of tested emergency and recovery plans that
taking the infrastructure dependencies into account is examined. The existence of
different networks that are composed of governmental / regulatory bodies and critical
infrastructure operators with national contact details are exchanged are examined.
The existence of information sharing and alert system based on this network is also
examined under this criterion.
Under the third criterion, some concrete steps are defined in order to struggle with
cyber crime. First of all, it is asked whether monetary loss because of crimes is
determined. The other precautions that are questions are threat assessment,
establishment of criminal offenses, reviewing existing laws, capacity building
mechanisms.
Fourth criterion questions some crucial activities that render the information sharing.
These activities are cross sector incident-information sharing during and after incidents,
the existence of rapid reaction mechanism, the usage of unclassified intelligence data,
the existence of situational awareness mechanism, cross sector incident management
and coordination mechanism that take the interdependencies into account.
Fifth criterion questions the budget assigned for cyber security research, national
funding for universities, the ratio of operational products that emanates from research
activities, the universities that offer degree in cyber security or information security, the
government incentive for innovation, the commitment to the internationally accepted

interoperability and security standards and the commitment to protect intellectual
property.
By using the results of these projects and documents, it is possible to say that if a
country lacks the following parameters or it has some deficiencies at these parameters,
it is not a mature country in terms of cyber security:
1) Overarching cyber security regulation that covers critical infrastructures
2) Public-private partnership for cyber security
3) Existence of information sharing and exchange mechanisms, existence of
collaboration and cooperation mechanism based on the relationships at state
level
4) Existence of cyber security budgeting at state level and the funding of cyber
security research
5) Existence of cyber security awareness and culture at state level, which also
flourishes the information security governance
3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts of Turkey
Since 2013, Turkey implemented some important steps at policy and strategy level in
order to become more resilient against cyber threats. These steps are:
1) The establishment of Cyber Security Council
2) The development and enactment of national cyber security strategy and 20132014 action plan
3) The cyber security amendments to the Telecommunications law
The cyber security council was established in October of 2012 with eleven permanent
members under the chairmanship of Minister of Telecommunication. All of the
members are representatives of public organizations. Any organization whether public
or private can be invited to the meeting of council according to the agenda. According
to the rules of action of council, it meets every six months regularly. The principal
duties of the council are
1) to determine the countermeasures
2) to approve policies, strategies and plans regarding cyber security; and
3) to ensure the application and coordination of policies, strategies, plans.
National cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan was enacted in June of
2013. There are twenty-nine action items in cyber security action plan. These items are
distributed under six different themes. These themes are:
1) Regulatory measures (2)
2) Activities to help with judicial processes (1)
3) Establishing the National Cyber Incidents Response Organization (1)
4) Strengthening the National Cyber Security Infrastructure (14)
5) Human Resources Education and Awareness Raising Activities in the Field of
Cyber Security (6)
6) Developing National Technologies in the field of Cyber Security (4)
7) Extending the Scope of National Cyber Security Mechanisms (1)
The numbers in parentheses are the number of action item in the theme.
Every action item is assigned to one responsible organization and at least one relevant
organization. All of the organizations, responsible or relevant, in action plan are public
organizations. There are thirty-one organizations in action plan. Fifteen of them have
responsibilities for at least one action item.

The scope of the national cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan is the
public organizations and critical infrastructures whether public or private organizations.
Therefore, the private organizations that have operations in a noncritical sectors are not
covered by national cyber security strategy and action plan.
A quick analysis of the action items yields the following results:
1) Six of the actions items are related with only public organizations.
2) One of the action item is related with only critical infrastructures.
3) Eight of the actions items are related with both public organizations and
critical infrastructures.
4) Four of the action items are related with the universities, national education of
different levels.
5) Ten of the action items are related with the whole country; although the scope
of the strategy is public organizations and critical infrastructures.
The English version of National cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan of
Turkey can be downloaded from Internet page of ENISA or CCD-COEi.
The cyber security amendments to the Telecommunications law are performed in
February of 2014. These amendments can be summarized as follows:
1) Insertion of Cyber Security Council with its roles and responsibilities
2) Insertion of new roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Telecommunication
regarding cyber security
3) Insertion of new roles and responsibilities of Information and
Telecommunications Technologies Authority regarding cyber security
The following roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Telecommunications are stated
in the amendments:
1) Determining the policies, strategies and goals in order to ensure the national
cyber security ,
2) Determining the methods and standards in order to ensure the cyber security
for public organizations, individuals, and organizations,
3) Preparing action plans,
4) Fulfilling the responsibilities regarding secretariat of cyber security council,
5) Coordination of cyber security tasks,
6) Determining critical infrastructures and related organizations,
7) Establishing and auditing the required response centers,
8) Supporting the studies on producing national software and hardware
9) Executing the cyber security awareness and training activities
3.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Program of Turkey
According to the National Cyber Security Framework Manual, a reference book
prepared by NATO Collaborative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, cyber security
function in national strategies can grouped in five different mandates [20]. These are:
1) Military Cyber Operations
2) Counter Cyber Crime
3) Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence
4) Cyber Security Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection
5) Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy
When one examine the action items of Turkey’s cyber security strategy, the major and
dominant mandate of Turkey’s cyber security strategy is “Cyber Security Crisis
Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection”. There are some sections and a few

action items about the “Counter Cyber Crime”. However these items do not enough to
change the emphasis to another mandate. There are no items about military operations,
cyber intelligence and internet governance and cyber diplomacy mandates in Turkey’s
cyber security strategy.
When we look at Turkish national cyber security strategy and action items as a whole,
it can be easily seen that Turkey tries to establish basic but essential countermeasures
in order to increase cyber resilience. The action items under first and second themes
aim to create necessary legal infrastructures on which other countermeasure will be
built. The only action item under third theme is action-item 4, which proposes the
establishment National Cyber Incidents Response Team (TR-CSIRT). The same action
item also proposes the establishment of Sectorial CSIRT for critical sectors and CSIRT
for public organizations. This action item is extremely important for state, sector and
organizational level cyber resilience. The establishment of sectorial CSIRTS is one the
most crucial study of Critical Infrastructure Protection agenda of Turkey. There are
fourteen action items under fourth theme. For context of this article, the most important
action items of this theme is action-item 5, which is called “Information security
management program in critical infrastructures”. This action item proposes the
following sub-actions:
1) Determination of critical infrastructures
2) Sectorial risk analysis of one of the critical infrastructures (pilot risk analysis)
3) Determination and publication of the method of sectorial risk analysis
4) Conducting risk analysis (yearly)
5) Determination of the requirements of sectorial emergency action plan and
business continuity plan
6) Determining and implementing the sectorial security precautions according to
the risk analysis, emergency plan and business continuity plan
The responsible organization for the first two sub-actions is The Scientific and
Technological Research Council of Turkey. The responsible organizations for the other
sub-actions are the public organizations responsible for regulating and auditing the
critical sectors.
The last action item that is directly related with the security of critical infrastructures is
action-item 10, which is under fourth team as well. Action-item 10 proposes publishing
the document of fundamental rules of secure software development for the software to
be used in critical infrastructures, preparing a feasibility report and submission of this
report to cyber security council.
The major mandate of Turkey’s cyber security strategy is “Cyber Security Crisis
Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection” as stated earlier. In this regard, the
whole cyber security strategy can be seen as a holistic critical infrastructure protection
program. On the other hand, there are three action items that are explicitly relates
security study to critical infrastructures. The directly related action items and their
effects
on
critical
infrastructures
are
summarized
in

Table 1.

Table 1. The action items that are directly related with the security of critical infrastructures
The number of action item
4

5

Action item
Establishing the National
Cyber Incidents Response
team and establishing the
Teams for Responding to
Cyber Incidents for Critical
Sectors and Public Entities
Information
security
management program in
critical infrastructures

•

•
•
•
•
•

•
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Implementation of the
software security program

•

•

Action sub-item(s)
Establishing
the
sectorial
CSIRTs which are specific to
critical infrastructure sectors,
and creating their teams as well
as providing trainings for them.
Determination
of
critical
infrastructures
Sectorial risk analysis of one of
the critical infrastructures (pilot
risk analysis)
Determination and publication of
the method of sectorial risk
analysis
Conducting risk analysis (yearly)
Determination
of
the
requirements
of
sectorial
emergency action plan and
business continuity plan
Determining and implementing
the sectorial security precautions
according to the risk analysis,
emergency plan and business
continuity plan
Publishing the document on
fundamental rules on secure
software
development
independent from programming
languages for the software to be
used in critical infrastructures.
The preparation of feasibility
report and submission of the
report to the cyber security
council.

There are some other action items within the action plan that may be considered as
contributing to the critical infrastructure protection program. However these
contributions can be regarded as indirect contributions. This action items are listed at

Table

2.

The

first

action

item

at

Table 2 propose to establish a distributed honeypot system to the national public
network in order to detect and response to cyber incident in a timely manner. The
second
action
item
at

Table 2 propose the establishment of a crisis management structure. Once this crisis
management structure established, it will definitely improve the security of
infrastructure especially during a cyber attack.

Table 2. The other action items that contributes to the Critical Infrastructure Protection
The number of action item
11
29

Action item
Implementation
of
cyber
threats prevention project
Integrating national cyber
security concepts into the
national security context

•
•

•

•

Action sub-item(s)
Establishing a Honeypot
system to detect cyber
threats.
Determining
the
responsibilities of public
organizations in case of
cyber security incidents in
the cyber space and how to
ensure
coordination
at
national level
Determining high priority
potential attack scenarios
targeting
the
country,
including the effects of these
attacks.
Determining priority actions
required to be carried out to
analyze and improve the
status of the mechanisms that
would be used in case of
potential cyber security
incidents.

3.2. Assessment of Cyber Security Maturity Efforts of Turkey
When we look at the efforts of Turkey between 2013 and 2014, the following results
can be obtained:
• The correct steps are taken at the beginning.
o Cyber Security Council is established in order to take decision
effectively.
o Cyber security strategy and action plan is prepared in a short time.
o The council and the ministry that is responsible for coordination
gained jurisdiction by law
• Some progress is observed in last two years. These are:
o Turkey determined its critical infrastructures. Because it is not
published by government, the authors cannot share the list of them.
o National CSIRT is established.
o A number of technical trainings on cyber security are completed.
o Cyber security master programs are opened within at least five
universities.
Despite the existence of some improvements in last two years, a number of tasks have
not been finished or even started. The most important indication for this situation is the
action items in national cyber security strategy and action plan. The action plan will
expire by end of 2014. The number of completed action items are quite low compared
to the uncompleted action items.
When the authors analyzed the core reasons for this situation, it has been seen that the
imperfections in cyber maturity resulted in this situation.
First of all, there is no overarching regulation that cover all critical infrastructures by
assigning duties to critical infrastructure operators and regulatory bodies of critical
sectors. The only effective regulation is the one that assigns duties to Ministry of

Communication. However assigning duties to coordinator body but not assigning any
responsibility to others will be not be effective.
Cyber security is a horizontal area because of ubiquitous use of cyber systems.
Therefore cyber security is the common problem of all organizations in all sectors such
that health, energy, transportation, public services. This situation requires collaboration
and cooperation in order to cope with cyber threats [21]. Because, a threat to a sector
will probably be threat to another. Threat information exchange is crucial in order to
deal with cyber threat. In Turkey, because of the privacy and confidentiality constraints,
organizations usually keep away from information sharing. The culture of cooperation,
collaboration and information exchange is quite tenuous because of lack of mechanism
to flourish these opportunities.
Public-private partnership is an accelerative force in order to cyber resilient societies. It
is important to combat cyber threats [22]. It is an important instrument at the efforts
securing critical infrastructures [23]. Turkey has not discovered the potential power of
the private sector in cyber security. First example is that, private organizations did not
participated in the preparation process of national cyber security strategy and action
plan. The second example is that, there is no private sector representative in cyber
security council. There are some critical sectors in which both public and private
operators have operations. However there is not or limited information and experience
sharing practices. There are no incentives by regulatory agencies in order to encourage
the information sharing between public and private infrastructure operators.
Although some concrete improvements has been done during last two years, Turkey do
not assigned budget to cyber security studies. The president of cyber security council
stated that, there will be no specific budget, organizations shall use the budget
dedicated to information processing facilities. The existence of dedicated budget will
definitely be one of the driving factors for continual cyber security.
The final constituent of cyber maturity is security awareness. Unfortunately, the low
level security awareness is a problem for Turkey. Despite the developments in recent
years, cyber security awareness is not prevalent at state level, only a few organizations
are aware of the criticality of cyber threats. This problem diffuse to the organizations.
The most notable reflection of this problem to organizations is the lack of information
security governance. The managers of organizations do not value the problem of cyber
threat correctly.
4. Conclusion
The success of critical infrastructure protection program is directly related to the level
of the national cyber maturity. A successful critical infrastructure protection program
will result in a resilient society against cyber threats and cyber war. In this regard,
critical infrastructure protection program stands between national cyber security and
cyber resilience in the context of cyber war.
Once a countrywide and strategically embraced critical infrastructure protection
program is succeeded, the effects of this program will penetrate into the organizations,
individuals and society by taking some technical or organizational actions like
awareness activities, exercises and new coordinator bodies. So that cyber resilient
society will emerge. Therefore, national cyber maturity is a prerequisite to a successful
critical infrastructure protection program. In the same way; critical infrastructure
protection program is a prerequisite to cyber resilient society. Although it seems like

the efforts pertaining to these three concepts are sequential, they should be iteratively
completed. As an example, the output of critical infrastructure protection program may
provide useful inputs to national cyber security efforts.
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